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Why is gold price going down?

Gold is heading for its worst weekly decline in eight months as interest-rate fears, forced liquidation and bearish bets combine to intensify bullion’s sell-off, with investors increasingly betting on further declines.
Analysts warn prices could fall further before finding a floor. Spot gold dropped 2.7 per cent to $3,525.25 an ounce on Friday, after touching a 14-month low, and was down about 9.2 per cent for the week. Gold prices hit a record $5,515 an ounce in January.
A stronger US dollar and mounting expectations of another Federal Reserve interest-rate increase eroded demand for the metal.
“Gold is facing a perfect storm of macro headwinds and forced liquidation,” said Chris Weston, head of research at Pepperstone.
A hawkish Federal Reserve has revived the dollar and pushed Treasury yields higher, creating a challenging environment for gold, which pays no interest and becomes less attractive when returns on other assets rise.
However, the sell-off is being amplified as investors rush to raise cash, selling assets – including gold – to meet margin calls amid a broad decline in global equities, especially technology stocks linked to the artificial intelligence trade.
Buying into IPO boom?
So, are investors liquidating gold assets to buy into the initial public offering IPO boom?
The surge in demand for high-profile AI listings, including Anthropic, could offer another competing destination for investor capital as gold loses momentum, according to analysts. However, there is little evidence yet of a direct rotation from gold into IPOs.
“The aggressive sell-off across global equities, notably the crowded AI trade, has forced investors to reduce leverage, meet margin calls and raise cash,” Mr Weston said. “Gold has become a source of liquidity rather than a destination for safety.”
Gold’s Friday slide reflects bearish forces that are now reinforcing one another, said Vijay Valecha, chief investment officer at Century Financial. “A hawkish Federal Reserve has revived the dollar, pressuring gold,” he said. “At the same time, the sell-off in AI-linked equities has prompted investors to raise cash across asset classes instead of driving them into havens.”
The Fed’s message that inflation remains too high has prompted markets to price in an almost certain rate increase in December, with the possibility of further tightening in January and March, Mr Weston added.
Investors bet on further declines
The bigger concern is that selling pressure could have further to run.
Trend-following funds have already increased their short positions in gold, while exchange-traded fund investors have yet to capitulate, leaving the possibility of more selling ahead, Mr Valecha said.
Despite the aggressive decline since the onset of the Iran war, gold has struggled to find a durable bottom.
Options markets are also signalling a shift in sentiment. Investors typically pay a premium for call options on gold as insurance against macroeconomic and geopolitical shocks. That premium is now shrinking relative to puts, which protect investors against price declines.
But a sharp correction does not necessarily mean gold’s longer-term investment thesis has collapsed, but it marks a significant cyclical repricing after investors became heavily positioned for further gains.
“The options market tells the story best,” Mr Valecha said. “Investors usually pay more for gold calls than for puts because they buy them as insurance against macro and geopolitical shocks. That premium is shrinking.
Why isn’t gold acting as safe haven?
Gold’s traditional role as a safe haven has not been lost, but it is being overshadowed by the need for investors to raise cash during a period of market stress.
“Gold’s safe-haven characteristics haven’t disappeared, but they don’t operate in isolation,” Mr Weston said. “In periods of acute market stress, investors often sell what they can rather than what they want to.”
Gold is being sold alongside equities and other risk assets, while the dollar is attracting defensive demand and higher Treasury yields are making bullion less attractive relative to interest-bearing investments.
“For buyers to return with conviction, I’d want to see three developments: a stabilisation in US real yields, a sustained pullback in the dollar and evidence that forced selling has largely run its course,” Mr Weston said. “Until then, geopolitical uncertainty alone may not be enough to restore gold’s safe-haven appeal.”
How low could gold prices go?
With gold trading at about $3,525 an ounce, the immediate focus is whether buyers can defend the psychologically important $3,500 level.
A sustained break below that could expose the $3,400 to $3,300 region, where longer-term investors and physical buyers may begin showing greater interest, Mr Weston said.
Investors should wait for selling pressure to ease, volatility to moderate and, ideally, a reversal in the dollar and US real yields before concluding that gold has established a sustainable low, he added.
The shift suggests traders are increasingly positioning for further downside rather than simply unwinding bullish bets, Mr Valecha said.
Gold may, therefore, continue to fall more than it recovers, with any near-term rebound potentially proving temporary rather than marking a reversal in the trend.
Mr Valecha also sees stronger support potentially emerging closer to $3,500 an ounce, despite the risk that prices could fall further in the near term.
On the upside, bullion would need to reclaim $3,600 before moving towards $3,700. The former support zone of $3,800 to $3,850 could now act as resistance, Mr Weston said.
Gold’s price action suggests it could remain under pressure in the coming days, with next week’s US economic data likely to prove important.
For investors and jewellery buyers in the UAE, analysts advise adopting patience and a staggered approach to buying rather than committing all their money at a single price.
Gold’s immediate downside focus is around $3,500 an ounce, following the break below the previous support level, said Frank Walbaum, market analyst at Naga.com.
“A sustained move below this psychological level could expose the metal to further losses towards the $3,200 level,” he said.

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Audacious train theft ring in California films multimillion-dollar robberies

A ring of thieves allegedly targeted dozens of freight trains in Southern California, stealing more than $22 million in merchandise — and brazenly filming the robberies themselves — before their arrests following a 14-month investigation.
It’s just one example of the growing problem of train heists in the U.S. The FBI estimated cargo theft losses in the U.S. and Canada reached nearly $725 million last year — up 60% from the year before. The Department of Homeland Security estimates cargo theft costs the U.S. between $15 billion and $35 billion a year.
Police say these thefts disrupt supply chains, potentially leaving customers with delivery delays and higher prices.
The alleged thieves in California targeted at least three dozen freight trains over more than two years and stole millions of dollars’ worth of goods including Nike sneakers, electronics and power tools, federal prosecutors say.
The crew coordinated their robberies through Instagram, the prosecutors said. Then they would board a moving train, cut air hoses or brake hoses to force emergency stops, and haul stolen goods to nearby stash houses.
Almost every step of the thefts was filmed. One video shows a suspect sawing into a cargo container above a moving train, then multiple men moving merchandise. One man even poses for the camera as the theft is carried out.
The stolen items would then be sold on the black market.
Fourteen men were arrested for their involvement in the theft ring. They face charges including conspiracy, theft of interstate railroad cargo, possession or receipt of stolen interstate railroad cargo, and violence against railroad carriers, according to a news release from the Department of Justice. Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan Hochman referred to the case as “the granddaddy of all train cargo theft prosecutions in L.A. County.”
During a news conference, LAPD Deputy Chief Alan Hamilton remarked that criminal investigations are “always easier when they post their own stuff on social media.”
Law enforcement agencies nationwide are stepping up efforts to curb these kinds of theft rings. In October, CBS News took an exclusive look behind the scenes of a first-of-its-kind national blitz where federal agents, railroad police and law enforcement in more than two dozen states worked together to track thieves targeting cargo trains.
During the operation, officials used infrared drone technology to track heat signatures along train tracks and in rail yards. Cmdr. Michael Ware, who leads the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Organized Retail Crime and Cargo Theft Task Force, told CBS News the technology is “like a third eye in the sky” that gives law enforcement “an advantage” and collects evidence. He showed CBS News video of one example of two men breaking the seals on a cargo container holding $35,000 worth of electronics.
“A lot of times we apprehend the guys and they come out like there’s no way we have no proof. I wasn’t in a container and they see the drone footage like ‘you got me.’ So it’s a game-changer,” Ware said.

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US will soon announce root cause behind FAA nationwide ground stop

The US government will announce soon the root cause of the router outage that led to the third-ever nationwide ground stop issued by the US Federal Aviation Administration. But questions remain about whether the FAA’s effort to modernize the national airspace system is being done with all the proper risk assessments and adequate agency oversight of the private contractors involved.
The nationwide ground stop blocked flight departures and impacted more than 1 million passengers across the United States for more than four hours on Friday, November 13. More than 12,000 flights were canceled on that day alone, with the number rising to more than 20,000 over the weekend as stranded travelers scrambled to find accommodations or alternative transportation. Some international flights were allowed to depart prior to the broader resumption of air traffic.
Nearly one week later, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford told news reporters that government investigators are “very close” to figuring out the root cause of the nationwide ground stop, according to CNN. Bedford also said that Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy plans to announce the findings at a news conference as soon as Friday, November 20.
Problems first arose when “data began flooding” the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network with 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds, according to an FAA Q&A post on November 15. The FTI network supports the flow of crucial flight data along with voice and video communications to air traffic control centers across the country.
That caused “instability with aircraft communications and radar feeds” at 17 of the 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers that manage en-route air traffic across the country, according to the FAA. The instability also impacted several Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities that guide aircraft both on approach and when departing from airports.
An initial agency investigation identified a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas, as “the reason for the excessive data flooding the systems.” The FAA’s network service provider, L3Harris, was installing a new router at the El Dorado site when the incident occurred and had recently installed a similar router in Texas.
Specifically, the L3Harris contractor was deploying a new Juniper Networks router to replace a 25-year-old Cisco router at the El Dorado site. But the subsequent incident prompted the FAA to pause installation of the Juniper routers and turn off those that had already been installed, falling back on the older Cisco routers, according to the Associated Press.
FAA employees typically conduct risk assessments and coordinate with contractors, such as L3Harris technicians, on system maintenance or upgrades, according to The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) union that represents FAA technicians. But in a statement, the union said that none of its FAA technicians were involved in the upgrades that led to the ground stop.
Similarly, CNN reported that the router replacement at the remote radio communications site in El Dorado was done by an L3Harris engineer without direct FAA oversight. The union and two sources told CNN that the FAA technician merely escorted the contractor into the facility and then turned his attention elsewhere without knowing what work the contractor was doing.
To get a former insider perspective, Ars conducted a lengthy interview with Philip Mann, a principal consultant at Vector Strategic Consulting LLC, where he advises on aviation safety and AI governance. Mann previously worked at the FAA in multiple roles for 17 years, starting as a technician at Denver International Airport and eventually becoming a training program manager at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.
(This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.)
Ars Technica: What do you see as some of the potential contributing factors that led to the nationwide ground stop?
Philip Mann: I spent a lot of time as a technician, and then did a bunch of things in between. And later on, I was an instructor at the FAA Academy, and then I did training program management. So I’ve seen a lot of this from all sides about how it’s supposed to work, and the thing that stood out to me the most immediately when I saw this is the time during the day in which the work was being done.
As an FAA technician, this is managed at the field person level. This is not like a top-down command-control thing. It is your job to cultivate a little credulity and think, “Okay, this thing I’m working on, what’s the worst thing that could happen? How far can it reach? What’s the blast radius?” This impacted a nationwide network, so by default the blast radius is the largest possible blast radius, so that basically means you take the maximum possible mitigations.
To kind of contrast that, when I worked at Denver [International Airport], a lot of times I was working on things that were on a single runway, like one approach lighting system or one electronic system, and the blast radius was just that runway, not even the whole airport, just that specific runway, and sometimes only that one end of that one runway. So you can still use the rest of it just fine.
And then maybe we work on a radar site, and a radar site might have a little more of a regional area. Most of the ones I worked on were kind of short-range radar, so it might be like a 50-mile radius or something. In which case you look at what the edges are, and you assume that if something goes wrong, that whole area just goes dark for air traffic controllers.
So you plan around that, and the coordination goes on up to regional, national stuff like this. And this is the far end of that, just basic risk management stuff. The bigger the potential impact, the more people and operations potentially affected, the more you emphasize doing things like working at night when there’s less traffic, which is when this should have been done.
And even Duffy has kind of acknowledged that [the FAA] confused the physical location of the facility with how far that system and service could reach within the national airspace system, and they had it completely backward. Yeah, on a map this is out in the middle of nowhere, but in a network diagram this router was immediately adjacent to all 22 of the [FAA’s air route traffic control] centers. Of those, 17 were affected, but it was immediately adjacent to all 22 of them.
That was the thing that immediately struck me: How clear it is that basic impact analysis and basic risk management seems to have just been completely gone.
It even goes a little bit further than that. As a technician, we used to have this rule that you don’t break anything on a Friday. We would actually not schedule certain work past lunch, and it wasn’t to get people off early. It was basically because, if something broke, somebody was going to have to come in on Saturday to fix it. You break it Thursday, people are going to be in on Friday anyway.
And then we had the commandment: “Thou shalt not be on the front page of the newspaper,” and it seems like all of that was missing here.
L3Harris should know better, because Harris has a history. Back in 2009, they misconfigured something and caused a big network outage. At the time, they had only identified a small handful—I want to say it was like a couple dozen potential areas of impact—and it wound up being like six times that. So they should know better.
(Ars note: The 2009 network incident was caused by a Harris technician incorrectly configuring a router that directs air traffic data through the FAA telecommunications network. That error ended up delaying thousands of travelers and grounded hundreds of flights nationwide.)
I don’t know how it was done on site, but when I did this work, quite often when contractors were working, I was the person who was there that got them cleared to the fence, that got their badges, that got them scheduled, that did the coordination with the airport authorities, and whatever else we had to do.
So there was always an FAA person that was the point of contact, and even on some facilities it might have to be an FAA person that physically pushes the button to turn the system back on. Like in a lot of cases, a contractor cannot do that, and it might be quite literally as simple as just flipping a switch. But the thing is, that action puts that system onto the national airspace system. That has to be done by the government. It can’t be done by a contractor.
Now, I don’t know if that’s the case here. I’m just saying it’s typical.
Ars Technica: The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) union representing FAA technicians put out a statement saying that, “historically contractors have followed a protocol where FAA employees conduct a risk assessment and coordinate the maintenance of the system or equipment.” The union then noted that “PASS-represented technicians” were not involved in the upgrades on the “contractor owned and maintained routers” that led to the ground stop.
Mann: In my experience, the union a lot of times is one of the groups that raises their hand and says, “Hey, hold on, we need a qualified person. What does that actually mean? Like, who on this list of people is qualified? Does that mean that they’ve had the class? Does that mean they’ve got a certification? Does that mean they’ve been here for a certain period of time?” But they’ll figure that out, and the answer is not always the same.
So, in a different FAA system at a different time, we had to get somebody who had been to a specific set of schools and, in one case, some specific vendor schools. The FAA at that time had only sent like a half-dozen people through those schools because they’re really expensive and really long. They had a couple in the east, a couple in the west, a couple in the middle, and every time they did one of these projects they would grab one of those people and put them on there, because that’s what a qualified person is.
Maybe they had somebody for the FAA that was there, but maybe that person was a new hire who was administratively qualified to be on site, meaning they had their background check and their driver’s license and had their access badges and all that. But maybe they didn’t even have a networking background or whatever. They were just the person who had the access and the free time and could be there.
But this is certainly a case, especially with the national-size blast radius of a network, that highlights the importance of having that qualified person, whatever that means. That is very much a union push to make sure that we know what the right qualified person means, that we know how to identify those people and that we’re treating those people fairly.
It’s important to understand that in the union leadership, they’re all former technicians and engineers, everybody who runs that union. Even the local shop people are all fully qualified. So they all know what’s going on. Their role in all this potentially is to cover that blind spot that management and contractors share.
Ars Technica: Based on what you described, it does sound like both the contractor side and the current FAA side were underestimating the potential blast radius for whatever reason.
Mann: Well, yeah, and Duffy has even indicated that they mistook the physically remote location for being a network remote location, and those two don’t correspond to each other. Duffy has said that it was the physical smallness and the physical remoteness of the site that somehow let them forget about what they were actually working on.
Ars Technica: That’s kind of astounding, isn’t it? It’s like the current FAA leadership acknowledging that somehow they didn’t know about their own network and the importance of different nodes in the network.
Mann: In recent years they’ve brought a lot more people into the fold with the FAA, and you can see that overall a lot of it is more Silicon Valley-type people. It’s not aviation people or risk people or even necessarily physical engineering people. And I make that separate distinction because physical engineering is way more rigorous than anything like software engineering—that’s hopefully public knowledge.
But they get a lot of people who’ve got the “move fast, break things” approach that even [Mark] Zuckerberg stopped believing in. They’ve got the “deploy it now, patch it later” mindset, like “Oh well, we just reboot it, or if it goes down, we’ll just be down for a little while; we’ll lose a few ad dollars or whatever.”
But the national airspace system is a whole different animal, because the national airspace system has to work all the time.
It is possible to bring things down and to do it in a scheduled way. We would shut down radar sites on purpose, but we would also put NOTAMs [Notice to Airmen advisories] out saying, “Hey, this airspace is not covered by radar right now,” and some of that stuff is done weeks and weeks and weeks in advance.
Now, at a national network scale, there’s not really a way to say, “By the way, just in case we might shut the NAS off, we might shut down all the airspace because we’re not sure if this one little router out in Arkansas someplace is going to cause problems.”
I have ideas about how this might have happened, but the long and short of it is, when they plugged it in, they didn’t adequately test it before they connected it back to the network some way somehow, and it could have been misconfigured. Maybe there was an approved configuration, somebody didn’t have it, so they just kind of winged it, or it could be that somebody got the wrong configuration. But again, we’ll wait for the root cause to come out, if it comes out sometime later.
Ars Technica: What are the main things that should have been done to prevent this from becoming a whole nationwide incident?
Mann: An important caveat is, I don’t know if this was a misconfiguration or just somebody making a mistake, or just a bad configuration that shouldn’t have worked. I don’t know how much testing was done.
But what should have happened is, with whatever necessary level of technician and engineer engagement, they should have done the blast radius assessment, the risk assessment. Duffy has already conceded they did not do a sufficient risk assessment. He has not said it exactly that way, but he has said that they misunderstood the risk in not so many words. They should have pulled up the network topology and looked at what does this actually touch.
One of the systems I used to work on a lot was backup power, so backup generators attached to a radar site. I was working on the generator, but I still marked the radar site as potentially out of service, because the power generator affects the radar site, and if the generator crashes, it’s going to take the radar site down.
So in a network, that’s just a million times more complex, because you really need to go, “How far could this reach?” You, of course, want to understand that at the networking level. You want to understand what all that is, but what they need to do is the proper risk assessment.
Do whatever engineering, whatever tests, whatever scenario things they want to do and really, really, really embrace that it’s not what you’ve seen before. What is the boundary of what is prohibited by physics? You’re talking about an interconnected network. There is nothing in physics that says a data bit from this router can’t get to the far end of the universe if they’re all connected. And thinking about that kind of stuff, assume it might fail.
That’s the first big thing, and that should have taken whatever amount of time it took. Because the benefit with this kind of a system is that same basic impact assessment, you know, plus or minus maybe a couple of relatively small variables, is going to apply to every single one of these installations across the entire country. If they’re doing one of them or doing 1,000 of them, they’re all network-interconnected devices that all do the same thing and all hit the same network.
So it sounds bad when you think about doing it for every single site separately, but when you do a full network analysis, you’re like, “We’ve got to do this really hard thing one time, and then we’ve got to assess to see if there’s been any changes as we migrate this network piece by piece. Does the new router significantly change anything? But it’s pretty easy from there.
Then, and this is the important part, then they need to behave as if they’re trying to keep that worst-case scenario thing from happening. Or even if they can’t keep it from happening, reduce the impact as much as possible.
So do it at midnight when, if you have a complete mass outage like this, it’s not too many travelers. Maybe a couple red-eye flights, a few cargo planes like UPS, FedEx, because those guys fly at night a lot, but it’s not 12,000 passenger planes.
That may not have prevented the absolute failure whenever we find out what that is, but it would have reduced how bad it got. If you’ve already done that kind of risk assessment, and you’ve briefed everybody accordingly, your technicians are sitting there in the building—hopefully they’re the right people—and they’re already braced to recover.
Every time I started an engine generator that was going to run a radar site, I would hold my breath for a second when I flipped a switch, because things can happen. You can do everything right, and you flip a switch, and the engine throws a rod or something. Nothing you could do about it. Nothing you would know to prevent or anything like that. But we would hold our breath for a second, make sure everything was operating fine. Go outside, look up, make sure the antenna is still spinning, all that kind of stuff.
It is the same kind of thing. These technicians, if they’re braced and ready to intercept the early signs of that worst case scenario failure, they’re not casual about it. They’re really thinking, “Okay, we need to watch this and look for any unusual behavior early, and then be ready to shut it back off or pull the plug or whatever if we start seeing something we’re not comfortable with.”
You’re kind of chopping off the impact from both sides a little bit. Technicians are more prepared to catch it faster, and even if it goes for a little bit, it’s not going to affect nearly as many people.
In this case it’s possible—don’t know but it’s possible—if this would have been at 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning, it might have started lighting up some lights somewhere, but they could have potentially shut it down, because you don’t have so many flights and data overloading the network. It’s possible, and just my speculation, it’s possible they could have seen it, flipped it off, let everything calm down, and not had a ground stop at all.
Ars Technica: The router installation issue that led to the nationwide ground stop was part of an ongoing FAA effort to modernize its overall system. What might this event indicate about the current state of the US National Airspace System?
Mann: This is one of the challenges with the FAA modernization. When they do that properly, nobody sees that there’s that kind of danger out there. It’s kind of the paradox of risk analysis, right? The better you are at it, the less essential people think it is, and that’s the FAA being a victim of its own success for the last 50 years. I’m not in that camp that everything that sounds old needs to be replaced. Floppy disks are totally fine as long as they still work, I don’t care.
But the agency has had a hard time modernizing, in part, I believe, because it is so safe and its risk management is normally so good that people lose sight of the fact that there isn’t modernization that needs to be done.
It’s not that they don’t want to modernize, and it’s not like the FAA doesn’t want to modernize. It’s just that it’s the old squeaky wheel thing, right? The FAA is so good at what it does that when it comes time to write checks, there’s always a different squeaky wheel that needs the money more.
Actually, I’m kind of happy for the current administration keeping this at the front. I don’t necessarily like how they’re doing it, but I do like that they’re making this a live issue in Congress. They’re making this a live issue even out here in different airports. I’ll talk to people and they’re like, “Hey, when are we going to modernize this?” Ten years ago, not too many people out in the public were talking about it.
I think the NAS is still just as safe as it’s always been. We can kind of be grateful. Folks probably ought to understand that because they see this on the news, it means it’s weird. It’s unusual. But it’s good that we can be safe and we can still have the conversation about it, about what needs to happen to keep it safe, because we don’t want to have a catastrophic failure somewhere down the line that really is because something failed or really is because something was neglected, and then try to say, “Oh yeah, now we’ve got to shut down our airspace for six months because something happened.”
I’m not a blank check person. I do not want [Congress] just writing a check and handing it to Duffy or anybody. I want them to do the proper acquisition oversight, do the proper union involvement, do the proper technical evaluations, all that kind of stuff, because that is money well spent.
We could have been really unlucky. We could have lost communication to all the aircraft that were in the air entirely. We could have lost the ability to be able to manage those aircraft, and then we would have been back to doing 1950s, 1960s kind of stuff, like call the airplane and have the airplane tell us where it is. And we probably would have seen some bad outcomes from that.
Ars Technica: It is definitely sobering to think that this was in some ways the best-case scenario from the situation that unfolded.
Mann: This was a best and worst [case]. In the resilience of the system, this was a best case because the system degraded all the way down to its essential mission of just keeping the aircraft safe. And an aircraft parked on the ground is as safe as it’s ever going to be, and the system was successful. The system is very resilient. It decayed down to its essential mission, and preserved that essential mission at the expense of literally everything else.
The apparent lack of risk analysis is a very clear example of the worst case scenario. The network-spanning maintenance being done in the middle of the day and allowed to cascade as a failure into the entire NAS, that was horrible. So a single set of technologies failed, but the NAS itself showed its resilience in preserving that key mission all the way down to the minimum function, to the absolute zero, where the only piece left was just keep it safe. That’s what it’s supposed to do.
We don’t want to see it go that far down. We’d much rather have them just divert flights a couple minutes here and there. But if we need to get it all the way down to the only thing we have is safe aircraft, I’m good with that.
Ars Technica: Duffy is saying the FAA needs $50 billion to make sure this doesn’t happen again. And if I understood correctly, you were saying it is good to have support for enough funding for the FAA to do what it needs to do, even if Duffy tying it specifically to “this happened because we didn’t have enough money” is not necessarily the correct assessment.
Mann: Yeah. This happened because there wasn’t the right oversight. I’d be pretty confident to say that. If we just take $50 billion and throw it at the same people doing the same thing the same way, we don’t get a better system. We just get a whole bunch more of this.
Because hiring more contractors and getting more routers replaced faster in the middle of the day with no risk assessment and incorrect configurations or however it came about… take some of that money and put it into oversight, put it into testing, and put it into whatever you need to do to make sure that however many more of these we’re going to do are done properly, and in this case, at 2 o’clock in the morning with a team of qualified people with the proper testing, people ready to pull a plug on it, all that kind of stuff. That’s money well spent.
Ars Technica: Many people have noted the coincidence of the FAA’s SMART AI system being deployed nationwide in the same week as the router issue that led to the ground stop. The FAA has said the SMART rollout had no connection to what ensued. What is your view on all this?
Mann: I get that. I think it is a coincidence. This particular router was just one of a long series of these replacements being done—they don’t take 1,000 routers and just replace them all on a Thursday. They might do one or two of them a night for a couple of years.
Now, just to lean into it a little bit, it could be totally possible that the router’s capabilities, or maybe something that was configured or misconfigured, is a facilitating technology for SMART. In other words, it’s not intended to be used right now, but they’re putting in a placeholder.
If you’ve got a deployment, you’ve got three steps. You’ve got an A, B, C step. Well, if you need some ridiculously high-powered, super fast switch or something at step C, you might put that in at step A, knowing you’re not using its full capability, because that’s when it makes sense to do that. Maybe it’s difficult infrastructure, physically hard to do or whatever.
But you put the super-fast switch in it at A, then you do step B, then you do step C, and only at that time when you get to step C are you actually going to start using the capabilities in that switch. And those might be years apart. I can imagine something like that being a subtext.
But the thing is, the SMART system looks out weeks and months in the future. It doesn’t touch the operation. It reads data, it does some stuff and makes some advising comments and makes some advising predictions, and then tells the air traffic control center folks, “Hey, y’all might want to do this.”
To the best of my knowledge and in my opinion, the SMART system doesn’t touch the actual operational data. In other words, it’s not something that reaches out across the whole network. It has certain data sets that are at the control center or wherever it is. There’s certain data that it has access to that it cannot push information into. It just draws from data and does analysis, and then it provides a recommendation to the traffic managers, and then those traffic managers act or don’t act on that information in some way.
SMART is a system that reads. You can think of it as a Wall Street guy who reads the ticker and makes some calculations and then hands a spreadsheet to the trader. The analyst is not the trader. The analyst is literally reading the screen, running some math, and then handing a ticket to the trader, and a trader makes the final decision.
That’s kind of what happens where the system looks at what’s going on in NAS, what’s forecast to go on in NAS, weather, all that kind of stuff, and then it does some calculations and it effectively hands a slip of paper to the air traffic controllers and says, “Hey, you might want to do this.” But none of that would mean that it’s Skynet getting onto the network or something like that.
This story was updated on November 20, 2026 to correct the description of the FAA ground stop’s impact on aircraft arrivals and departures. It was also updated to clarify one of Mann’s comments on the “move fast, break things” approach.

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Top White House cybersecurity official leaves after cyber failures

White House national cyber director Sean Cairncross is leaving his post, with Pentagon CIO Kirsten Davies set to serve as acting director after a week of high-profile U.S. technology outages.
The role, which advises the president on cybersecurity and coordinates U.S. cyber policy across federal agencies, has been handed to Pentagon chief information officer Davies on an interim basis. A permanent national cyber director must first be nominated by the president and then confirmed by the Senate.
Axios first reported Cairncross’s exit, citing two White House officials who said President Donald Trump’s chief of staff Stephen Miller pushed for his departure. One official told Axios that Miller thought Cairncross “lacked the strong cyber credentials to perform the job.”
The White House and the Office of the National Cyber Director did not immediately respond to a CNBC request for comment. A White House official confirmed Cairncross’s departure to NBC News and CBS News on Thursday.
It comes after a series of technology outages, including a nationwide aviation ground stop, a worldwide Microsoft Outlook outage and a reported blackout of the National Security Agency’s classified communications network.
The White House has insisted that there are no indications of a coordinated cyberattack, state-sponsored activity or malign actor behind recent tech outages.
Davies addressed her responsibilities in the new position and thanked Miller and President Donald Trump for their confidence late Thursday.
“Our nation stands in the crossroad of analog, digital, and quantum technologies, our American way of living increasingly interconnected. Our opportunity is to dominate the cyber landscape for generations to come… but only if we modernize and drive resilience into the foundations our great nation runs on,” she wrote on X.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio both congratulated Davies on her appointment.

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As Trump courts Xi and Putin, middle powers make their own moves

BEIJING/TOKYO, Nov 20 (Reuters) – As President Donald Trump sought to reshape the world order around great powers this week, two US allies looked beyond Washington. Canada ​found an opening in Beijing. Japan, at odds with China, turned to partners elsewhere in Asia.
Their middle-power diplomacy was overshadowed on Thursday ‌when Trump joined Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a lakeside villa in Shenzhen for a meeting that dominated the APEC leaders’ summit.
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Trump boasted it was “bigger than Yalta”, the 1945 conference at which the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union divided up postwar Europe.
The meeting’s symbolism mattered even without a substantive agreement, said Alejandro Reyes, an adjunct professor at ​the University of Hong Kong.
“This is the first time the leaders of the three largest nuclear powers have sat down together,” he said.
But Tokyo and ​Ottawa’s efforts to forge new alliances show how middle powers can reach for alternative markets and suppliers to help maneuver around ⁠Washington’s tariffs or Beijing’s trade restrictions, while new defence partnerships give them more options on security.
“Countries want to reduce dependence on China’s supply chains and economy. But ​they are also de-risking against the US,” said Zhao Minghao, an international relations expert at Shanghai’s Fudan University.
Canada and Japan show those efforts are gaining traction but also ​how geography and geopolitics shape which partners they can turn to.
CARNEY PUSH
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, a vocal critic of Trump, has taken the lead in forging middle-power deals.
Ten months after urging the world’s middle powers to make common cause, Carney went into APEC having concluded free-trade talks with the Philippines and moved closer to a separate economic pact with the Association of ​Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
In Shenzhen, the Canadian leader agreed with Xi to extend a tariff deal through 2028 in which Beijing expanded relief on a further C$400 million ($279.39 ​million) in Canadian goods, including on pork and prawns. Ottawa lowered barriers on imports of some Chinese steel and aluminium.
In Manila, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sought new supplies of critical ‌minerals to ease ⁠Japan’s reliance on China and adopted a joint statement on economic resilience with ASEAN. She also agreed to strengthen cooperation with South Korea on supply chains and energy.
Japan and Canada are also working together on critical minerals and building ties in Europe.
Canada and the European Union launched a partnership on energy and technology last month. Japan is building an advanced fighter jet with Britain and Italy, and last year secured a deal for heavy rare earths from a French refinery.
JAPAN’S OPTIONS
For Takaichi, hedging against uncertainty ​over US support by striking deals in ​Beijing is not an option.
Japan relies ⁠heavily on US military power to deter threats from nuclear-armed neighbours, including China, Russia and North Korea. It hosts the biggest concentration of US military firepower deployed overseas and it stays close to Washington.
Tokyo’s relations with China are also at their worst ​in years. The chill was on display at APEC, where Takaichi received a low-key welcome that contrasted with the fanfare for ​Trump.
Trump’s wooing of Xi ⁠reinforced concerns within Takaichi’s administration about Washington’s commitment to its longtime ally, a senior Japanese government official told Reuters, asking for anonymity because they are not authorised to talk to the media.
“I think Prime Minister Takaichi’s trip abroad this time made that explicit. Japan has no choice but to live by its own strength as a middle power,” ⁠the official ​said.
China’s treatment of Japan could spur further middle-power cooperation, said Narushige Michishita, a professor at Japan’s National ​Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
“Japan may be the target today, but other countries can see that they could find themselves in the same position tomorrow,” he said. Cooperation won’t replace US influence but it “will increase resilience,” ​he added.
($1 = 1.4317 Canadian dollars)
Reporting by Mei Mei Chu, Tim Kelly, Tamiyuki Kihara, Nobuhiro Kubo, Joyce Zhou, Ellen Zhang, Heejin Kim and Alasdair Pal; Editing by Saad Sayeed

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Senate passes BAAJA bill backed by AI, energy sectors

Justin Sullivan | Getty Images
The Senate on Thursday passed a long-sought bill to ease the nation’s environmental permitting laws and overhaul electrical transmission regulations, a crucial step toward boosting construction for the energy and technology industries.
Senators voted 62-33 to pass the bill, which split Democrats just weeks after they flipped enough seats from Republicans in the midterm elections to give them majorities in both chambers of Congress in January. The bill, known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026, is projected to lower energy costs for consumers while weakening some environmental laws to speed up the permitting process.
The vote offers a window into the fissures forming in the Democratic Party as it prepares to assume full control of Congress in January and tries to address the affordability crisis that catapulted it to power.
More Democrats voted against the permitting measure than voted for it. Still, more than a dozen — including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y. — voted to pass it over the objections of climate groups and tribes to get the bill across the finish line.
“It’s going to be legislation that’s really going to make the biggest difference for the next 100 years, especially bringing down carbon emissions once this president is gone,” Sen. Ruben Gallego, D-Ariz., told reporters on Thursday before the vote. Gallego supported the measure.
The bill’s Senate passage is a key step to it becoming law, but it would also need to clear the House before heading to President Donald Trump’s desk.
Democratic supporters of the bill touted its cost benefits as a win after they ran campaigns on affordability, and pointed to a massive glut of clean energy the bill could bring onto the grid. Opponents lamented rollbacks to the nation’s bedrock environmental protection laws favored by the fossil fuel industry and Republicans, and warned the measure could offer carte blanche authority to the data centers undergirding artificial intelligence.
“No big, bipartisan bill is going to be perfect for everyone, but we have a real opportunity to make electricity more affordable for families. Working people can’t afford to wait another few years for us to get this done,” Sen. Martin Heinrich, D-N.M., the incoming chair of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and an author of the bill, said in a statement to CNBC.
Bill Clark | Cq-roll Call, Inc. | Getty Images
Heinrich brokered the agreement with his counterpart Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, along with Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., and Shelley Moore Capito, R-W.Va., the top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.
“Earlier this month, Americans sent a clear message: They want Congress focused on making their lives more affordable. That’s precisely what this permitting reform bill will do,” he said.
Getting to a final vote was acrimonious. Senators amended the package in the weeks leading up to the vote to address concerns from Native American tribes, which objected to changes in their participation in permitting.
“I’m not going to sit around and let these data centers scar our treasures,” Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., told reporters Thursday about the push for his amendment, which would have blocked data centers from being built on public lands.
Tom Williams | Cq-roll Call, Inc. | Getty Images
Clean energy and fossil energy groups both cheered the bill’s passage in the Senate.
As negotiated, the bill would benefit both renewables and fossil fuels. Artificial intelligence and the broader tech industry also stand to benefit — despite the bill’s provision forcing hyperscalers to pay for upgrades to the grid — as power-hungry data centers demand more electricity.
The American Clean Power Association, a group that represents renewables, said it was “a clean energy bill that will modernize America’s energy systems and lower consumer prices.”
The American Petroleum Institute, which represents the oil and gas industry, called the bill a “major breakthrough on historic permitting reforms that would deliver more affordable energy for consumers, cut costly delays, and build much-needed critical infrastructure.”
Renewables would benefit largely from the bill’s electricity transmission component, along with measures aimed at blocking Trump from cancelling already-permitted wind and solar projects. New solar and wind projects are often bottlenecked by a lack of transmission able to deliver power to the grid.
Rhodium Group, an economic research firm, estimates the bill would allow an additional 17 to 249 gigawatts of clean energy to be built by 2040. Natural gas exports would rise 8% to 15% beyond a 76% to 145% rise already accounted for under current policy. Greenhouse gases would be reduced by 5 to 148 million metric tons annually in 2040.
“A lot of Democrats are involved and supportive in this deal because expanding grid capacity would integrate a lot of clean energy,” said Rob Gramlich, the founder and president of Grid Strategies, an energy consulting group. “Republicans are maybe less interested in that benefit, but they do care about economic growth and serving new large loads. And I think members on both sides of the aisle are pretty well aware that we’re doing much less grid investment here in the U.S. compared to other countries.”
Gramlich added that “you can’t get to 60 to 80% of our grid from renewable energy without a significant expansion of grid capacity.”
However, the Natural Resources Defense Council was among the opponents.
“The House should not pass a bill that gives President Trump a blank check to reward oil and gas companies and data center developers,” the organization said in a statement. “Lawmakers should oppose this bill and try again next year to pass legislation worthy of the American people, not for the fossil fuel industry and data center companies.”
The bill now heads to the House, where Republican leadership is expected to attempt to pass it. Trump also supports the deal.
But as in the Senate, Democrats are expected to be divided.
“Democrats promised to lower bills, cut pollution, and protect ratepayers,” said Rep. Scott Peters, D-Calif., a longtime champion of permitting reform. “Voters are giving us a chance to show we mean it. BAAJA does all three. We should pass it before the end of this Congress.”
House Natural Resources ranking member and likely incoming Chair Jared Huffman, D-Calif., meanwhile, urged Democrats to say no to the permitting bill.
“Don’t believe the lie that this terrible bill, exactly as drafted, is the last, best and only chance to ever do permitting reform,” he said. “We can produce a better deal.”

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